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Government intervention in private R&D activity is common practice 
nowadays. However, its impact may not be unambiguously positive. First, companies 
may simply replace private R&D budgets with the public R&D grant. Second, even if 
an increase in private R&D investment is confirmed, it may not automatically induce 
more R&D output: the additional R&D budget may be crowded out by duplicate or 
more risky research, or a mere increase in researcher wages. 
This paper empirically analyzes the effect of public R&D subsidies on private 
R&D investments, employment and wages in Flanders, using a parametric treatment 
effects models on the funding status as well as IV regression models on the amount of 
funding. Positive additionality effects are supported, measured in terms of R&D 
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1. Introduction 
R&D activity fosters economic growth (Romer, 1990) and is crucial in every 
modern economy these days. However, R&D is a high-risk activity entailing a 
substantial level of uncertainty (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1987). Large R&D 
investments may not (immediately) lead to results which contribute significant 
value to a company (Rosenberg, 1974). One of the main concerns of R&D 
managers therefore is to attract qualified and motivated personnel, apt to conduct 
R&D activities with a considerable degree of success. The lack of qualified 
personnel is an important bottleneck, seriously hampering innovative activity 
(Eurostat, 2004 as well as Mohnen et al., 2008). Moreover, sooner or later, 
knowledge created in the R&D process becomes available to other companies, 
which have the opportunity to free ride and exploit this knowledge (Arrow, 1962). 
Mobility of R&D personnel is one of the main factors explaining (un)desired 
spillovers between companies (Mansfield, 1985). Maliranta et al. (2008) mitigate 
this effect though, as they find that most of the knowledge which is transferred by 
employees, is knowledge which can be easily copied and implemented without 
substantial additional R&D efforts. An adequate remuneration therefore is crucial to 
attract, stimulate and retain highly competent R&D personnel. Earnings are an 
important determinant in the remuneration system, although also intrinsic 
motivations like job satisfaction and exciting job opportunities matter (Coombs and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1991). Researcher wages consume the lion’s share of the total R&D 
expenditure of a company. 
An adequate remuneration system may attenuate the free-rider problem, but 
also the government can play an important role through public intervention. 
Because of the negative externalities (see e.g. Arrow, 1962) in the R&D process, 
companies are expected to invest less than what is socially desirable and as a 
consequence some projects, despite their significant social benefit, will not be 
executed. An R&D subsidy lowers the cost of a private R&D project and possibly 
alters its outcome into an expected net profit, resulting in a positive decision to 
conduct the project. Subsidies for R&D projects by now have become a well-
established government intervention tool in the private R&D sector. However, 
companies may well replace their own, private money with the grant they received   3
from the government, which would in the end not increase total private R&D 
expenditures. Empirical research on this crowding-out hypothesis is vast (see e.g. 
Aerts et al., 2007 for a survey of the empirical evidence) and many researchers 
reject, while others support it. However, as David and Hall (2000) suggest: ‘the 
more the better’ is a questionable statement when it comes to R&D expenditure. 
Mere R&D expenditures may not constitute an adequate measure to evaluate the 
effectiveness of R&D subsidies. They advise to introduce the close 
interconnectivity between scientific labour markets and R&D investment decisions 
into the evaluation process of public R&D policy. Goolsbee (1998) came to the 
conclusion that R&D subsidies are primarily translated into researcher wage 
increases, inflating positive additionality effects by 30% to 50%. Wallsten (2000) 
and Suetens (2002) agree as their data refute the argument that R&D subsidies 
stimulate the demand for R&D personnel. Yet other researchers find positive 
estimates for increases in the R&D staff due to a subsidy (Üçdoğruk, 2004; Ali-
Yrkkö, 2005; as well as Reinthaler and Wolff, 2004).  
This paper empirically analyzes the effect of public R&D subsidies on private 
R&D investments, employment and wages in Flanders, employing parametric 
treatment effects models and IV methods. In the next section, the relevant literature 
will be discussed. Subsequently, I come to a brief explanation of the econometric 
methods underlying the empirical evidence. After a description of the data in the 
fourth section, the estimation results are presented and subsequently discussed in the 
two last sections.  
2. Literature Review 
The evaluation of public R&D policy has been extensively addressed in 
empirical research. David and Hall (2000) conclude in their review of evaluation 
studies on innovation input that the results on potential crowding-out effects are 
ambiguous, and they criticize that most existing studies neglect the problem of 
sample selection bias: it is not implausible that an endogenous relationship exists 
between R&D investments and the receipt of public R&D grants. On the demand 
side of public funding, R&D intensive firms may well be more likely to apply for a 
subsidy: they are more apt to market their project as being highly interesting for 
society and exhibiting a high expected rate of success. Moreover, they may be better   4
acquainted with the eligibility criteria and the procedures to apply for a subsidy. On 
the supply side of the public funding system, the government may just as well be 
more inclined to grant them a subsidy, as R&D intensive firms exhibit a higher 
expected rate of success. This makes R&D funding an endogenous variable, which 
may seriously distort evaluation results. In the next section, I expound on the 
methodological consequences of this endogeneity problem. More recent research 
takes this potential sample selection bias into account through selection models, 
instrumental variable (IV) estimations (including simultaneous equation systems), 
difference-in-differences estimations and matching techniques. So far, Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Flanders, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden and the US have been subject to an R&D input evaluation analysis of their 
public R&D funding system. These studies tend to reject full crowding-out effects 
but the results are ambiguous
1. Key reasons for these diverging conclusions are the 
use of different estimators, as well as the application for a broad range of countries, 
each with their own specific S&T policy (David and Hall, 2000).  
However, more private R&D investments do not necessarily translate into 
more R&D output. Moreover, even if an increase in private R&D activity is 
confirmed, it may not be beneficial for the society. Inefficiencies may rise from 
duplicate research (Irwin and Klenow, 1996 as well as David and Hall, 2000), 
though Dasgupta and Maskin (1987: 582) state that “parallelism need not imply 
waste”. The additional R&D budget may be allocated to more risky and therefore 
potentially less successful projects (Setter and Tishler, 2005). Romer (2000) 
denounces the mismatch between policy measures stimulating the private demand 
for scientists and engineers and the incapability of the educational system to provide 
a positive supply response. Consequently, David and Hall (2000) advocate the 
introduction of labour market dynamics into the additionality issue.  
Although the development of econometric methods (see Heckman et al., 1997 
and Heckman et al., 1999 for a survey) to counter the difficulties in measuring the 
effectiveness of policy programs originated in labour market economics (the 
                                                           
1 Aerts and Czarnitzki (2004 and 2006), Aerts and Schmidt (2008), Ali-Yrkkö (2004), Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), Clausen 
(2007), Czarnitzki (2001), Czarnitzki and Fier (2002), Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), Duguet (2004), Ebersberger (2005), 
Fier (2002), González and Pazó (2006), González et al. (2005), Görg and Strobl (2007), Hussinger (2008), Hyytinen and 
Toivanen (2005), Lööf and Heshmati (2005) and Streicher et al. (2004) reject full crowding-out effects, while Busom (2000), 
Heijs and Herrera (2004), Kaiser (2004), Lach (2002), Suetens (2002), Toivanen and Niininen (2000) as well as Wallsten 
(2000) find indications that public R&D funding replaces private R&D investments to some extent. The interested reader is 
referred to Aerts et al. (2007) for a survey of the recent literature on the evaluation of public innovation policy.   5
evaluation of labour programs including public job training and active labour 
market policies), the main research issue in additionality research of R&D subsidies 
became to find out how much more private R&D investments were made, due to the 
provision of public money for private R&D activities. The impact on the R&D 
workforce has been ignored to a large extent.  
To the best of my knowledge, only a limited number of studies explores this 
research path, either on the macro (Reinthaler and Wolff, 2004) or micro (Goolsbee, 
1998 for individuals and Wallsten, 2000; Suetens, 2002; Üçdoğruk, 2004 and Ali-
Yrkkö, 2005 for firms) level. The empirical evidence is not unanimous, however. 
One explanation can be found, by analogy with diverging results in the more 
traditional R&D additionality research, in the use of different datasets, covering 
different regions and time windows and the application of various methodologies. 
Another explanation is the behaviour of the inputs of the R&D process, including 
the supply of R&D personnel. Different hypotheses are put forward in the literature, 
predicting the elasticity of the supply of researchers and their wages. A subset of the 
studies mentioned above additionally substantiates proof on the impact of public 
R&D funding on R&D wages (Goolsbee, 1998; Reinthaler and Wolff, 2004; 
Üçdoğruk, 2004 and Ali-Yrkkö, 2005). An overview of the main characteristics of 
these articles is presented in Table 1. In the following subsections a synopsis of the 
literature on additionality effects on R&D employment as well as R&D wages is 
presented and the hypotheses, which will be tested in the empirical part, are derived.   6
Table 1: The impact of public R&D funding on employment and wages: literature overview 
Impact of R&D subsidies on: 
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*Note: although Wallsten (2000) measures the impact on total employment in a dataset of small high-tech SBIR funded firms, he (2000: 89) signals that “most employees in these small firms are likely to be 
scientists, engineers, or others who are directly involved in R&D”. Also Ebersberger (2004) studies the impact on firms’ employment. However, he adds that, as the subsidy program under investigation targets 
R&D activities, the impact of the program can be evaluated in terms of R&D labour demand. Therefore, I consider their studies being comparable with the other studies listed, which explicitly measure the impact 
of public R&D funding on R&D employment.    7
2.1. Public R&D funding and R&D employment 
Applying fixed effect panel regressions on a panel dataset containing data on 
15 OECD countries from 1981 to 2002, Reinthaler and Wolff (2004) estimate 
positive additionality effects for R&D investments, as well as a smaller, but still 
significant increase in national R&D employment. Goolsbee (1998) investigates 
survey data on the income of 17,700 scientists and engineers in the U.S. from 1968 
to 1994. He relates the total and federal R&D expenditure to income as well as 
wages and hours worked in an OLS framework. The impact of federal R&D 
expenditure on the number of hours worked is not significant.  
Suetens (2002), Üçdoğruk (2004) and Ali-Yrkkö (2005) all apply a 
production function framework, taking information on subsidy receipt into account. 
Suetens (2002) uses panel data on Flemish firms observed between 1992 and 1999 
to estimate an R&D personnel equation and an output (added value) equation with 
instrumental variables and finds that crowding-out effects cannot be rejected 
offhand. Üçdoğruk (2004) employs a panel dataset on Turkish R&D active 
manufacturing companies, observed between 1993 and 2000. She concludes that 
R&D support programs significantly increase the demand for R&D personnel, 
especially for researchers holding a graduate degree. However, she does not correct 
for the potential endogeneity bias embodied in the relationship between the demand 
for R&D personnel and public R&D funding. In his set of Finnish firms, observed 
between 1997 and 2002, Ali-Yrkkö (2005) estimates significantly positive effects 
on R&D employment.  
Wallsten (2000) and Ebersberger (2004) present two studies which are closely 
related to this research issue and which are therefore included as well. Wallsten 
(2000) evaluates the impact of US SBIR grants to small high-tech firms on their 
total employment in an IV approach. Although this funding is not explicitly 
intended to support R&D activities, the author signals (Wallsten, 2000: 89) that 
“most employees in these small firms are likely to be scientists, engineers, or others 
who are directly involved in R&D”. He finds that larger firms are more likely to 
receive a grant, but additionality effects on employment cannot be confirmed. 
Ebersberger (2004) investigates the impact of two-year grants, allocated in 1996, on   8
the total labour demand in Finnish companies employing matching and difference-
in-differences methods. He claims that, as the subsidy program under investigation 
targets R&D activities, the impact of the program can be evaluated in terms of R&D 
labour demand. His estimates demonstrate no significant impact. From this review 
of research on R&D subsidies and R&D employment, it becomes clear that the 
evidence is mixed: both neutral as well as positive effects are found.  
Two elements may introduce some dynamics into the subsidy-employment 
relationship. First, increased R&D investments due to a subsidy may stimulate 
company growth and only in a second phase lead to increased R&D employment. 
See e.g. Chennels and Van Reenen (1999) for a survey of studies on the impact of 
technological change on employment. Second, as Reinthaler and Wolff (2004) 
suggest, technology spillover effects may exist: a subsidy may induce the 
development of a new technology, which nevertheless draws heavily on knowledge 
incorporated in existing technologies, and may therefore stimulate other firms to 
build on that technology. As a result, one could expect that the impact of public 
R&D funding is larger in the long than in the short run. Positive long-run effects on 
R&D employment are found by Lerner (1999), Ebersberger (2004) as well as 
Reinthaler and Wolff (2004).  
2.2. Public R&D funding and R&D wages 
R&D wages absorb a significant share of the total R&D expenditure (e.g. in 
Flanders on average around 67% in Czarnitzki et al., 2006). Therefore, also the cost 
of the input factor of R&D personnel, i.e. R&D wages, plays an important role in 
additionality research on R&D employment: R&D wages may adversely interact 
with Science and Technology policy measures introduced by the government. This 
may provide a sound explanation to why the publicly induced increase in R&D 
staffing does not keep up with the induced increase in R&D expenditure. 
Reinthaler and Wolff (2004) observe a simultaneous increase in national R&D 
investment and R&D employment. The increase of the R&D staff is smaller, 
though, which brings them to the conclusion that also scientists’ wages experience 
an increase. Goolsbee (1998) concludes that increases in R&D expenditure are 
mainly allocated to researcher wages and not to research effort. Ebersberger (2004)   9
claims that the Finnish innovation system provides an adequate inflow of 
researchers, and that therefore an increase in R&D investments is fully absorbed by 
an increase in R&D employment, but he does not put his statement to the test. This 
is however done by Ali-Yrkkö (2005), who concludes that R&D subsidies have, in 
addition to a positive effect on the number of R&D employees, also a significantly 
positive effect on researcher wages. Üçdoğruk (2004) finds indications that in 
Turkey, R&D subsidies significantly increase researcher wages. So, although there 
is substantial ambiguity concerning the impact of R&D subsidies on R&D 
employment, there is consensus on the fact that researcher wages increase when a 
company receives an R&D subsidy.  
Also few attempts have been made to assess the impact of R&D tax credits on 
private R&D wages. Although in this paper, the explicit focus is on direct R&D 
funding, the main results are briefly mentioned. Marey and Borghans (2000) 
estimate the wage effect of R&D tax incentives in the Netherlands and estimate 
average elasticities of R&D wages to the total sectoral R&D expenditure of 0.52 in 
the short run and 0.38 in the long run. Lokshin and Mohnen (2008) estimate a short 
run elasticity of 0.10 and a long run elasticity of 0.12 in the Netherlands. Haegeland 
and Møen (2007) assess the Norwegian R&D tax credit measure and estimate an 
elasticity of 0.33. 
The latter studies typically conclude that the increase of R&D wages provokes 
a significant inflation problem in additionality research: it is criticized that a 
substantial part of the subsidised money dissipates, as it perishes into mere R&D 
wage increases, without any actual impact on R&D activity. Goolsbee (1998) 
estimates that, as a result of R&D wage increases, additionality effects of R&D 
subsidies may be overestimated by 30% to 50%. The indirect impact of this wage 
increase may be even worse, since an increase in researcher wages may also affect 
non-funded firms, as they have to downsize their R&D activity (Goolsbee, 1998 and 
Hinloopen, 2004).  
Inelastic labour supply 
The argument of inflated additionality effects is typically based on the 
underlying hypothesis that the supply of R&D personnel is inelastic. An inelastic 
labour supply increases the search costs for competent scientists and engineers and   10
strengthens the bargaining power of R&D employees in wage negotiations (Lokshin 
and Mohnen, 2008).  
Goolsbee (1998) provides evidence that the supply of scientists and engineers 
is relatively inelastic. Reinthaler and Wolff (2004) make a stand against a priori 
expectations about the elasticity of the R&D labour supply. An elastic supply curve 
can be expected when considering the large pool of university graduates available to 
R&D companies on the one hand and the number of researchers actually employed 
as R&D staff on the other hand. Lundborg (2005) concludes that supply is not a 
restrictive variable, as the underutilization of potential R&D employees is 
substantial. However, Goolsbee’s findings (1998) on an inelastic labour supply 
curve are not unrealistic when R&D is performed by thin on the ground experienced 
and highly specialized scientists. Trajtenberg (2000) also claims that shortages of 
highly skilled personnel in cutting edge technologies are a pervasive phenomenon in 
Israel. By contrast, Ebersberger (2004: 22) rejects the existence of this problem in 
Finland, as “the Finnish innovation system has been able to constantly increase the 
supply of science and technology graduates”. The reader should bear in mind 
however, that Goolsbee (1998) runs his analysis on survey data on the income of 
scientists and engineers, including both public and private R&D staff. One could 
expect that the researcher supply elasticity is highly dependent on the sector. 
Research in universities versus companies may require and/or attract a different 
kind of researcher. Reinthaler and Wolff (2004) compute elasticities of the labour 
supply in 15 OECD countries. Their estimates are rather low, but significantly 
larger than the estimates of Goolsbee (1998). They find an additional explanation 
for a potential underestimation of the labour supply elasticity in Goolsbee’s exercise 
(1998) in the fact that he uses data from a period exhibiting extraordinary 
government intervention. Moreover, the supply elasticity is measured in a different 
way: Goolsbee (1998) calculates the increase in the average working time in 
reaction to higher wages, while Reinthaler and Wolff (2004) also allow for the 
additional employment of R&D workers.  
Upskilling process 
Nevertheless, Goolsbee’s (1998) pessimism may be alleviated, as R&D wage 
increases do not necessarily equate a loss of R&D effort. For example, in a general   11
employment context, Merito et al. (2007) test the impact of public funding and 
record positive effects on SME wages on the short (two years) and long term (four 
years) and conclude that the simultaneity of increased R&D staffing and higher 
wages signals an ‘upskilling’ process: the employment structure is shifted towards 
more skilled employees. Katz and Murphy (1992) also found that rapid growth in 
the demand of skilled workers appears to be the driving force behind changes in the 
wage structure. Translated into an R&D environment, this would render the R&D 
effort of an equally large R&D staff more efficient. Moreover, the population of 
(potential) R&D employees is not homogeneous. Zucker and Darby (1996: 12709) 
state that “scientific breakthroughs are created by, embodied in, and applied 
commercially by particular individuals responding to incentives and working in 
specific organizations and locations”. As a result, in high-tech firms intellectual 
capital of key personnel is far more important than physical assets (Darby et al., 
1999). Therefore, partial or even full crowding-out of additional R&D investments 
into higher wages is not necessarily bad: if companies are able to allocate a larger 
budget to their human capital, this may strengthen their power in the competition to 
attract top researchers. 
Determinants of R&D wages 
Wage dispersion may originate in employee as well as employer specificities. 
Individual worker characteristics, among which gender and age are most important, 
determine a significant share of wage dispersion. Also, considerable disparities in 
the pay slip are due to differences in the workplace. A large share of the literature 
on wages focuses on the positive correlation between company size and wages as 
well as the impact of sector affiliation. Larger companies typically write higher pay 
slips. Different explanations can be found: higher wages may serve as a 
compensation mechanism for a more complex working environment in larger 
companies; act as an instrument to increase the workforce’s motivation; or reflect 
differences in the composition of the workforce. Heterogeneity in the composition 
of the workforce, generating a larger share of skilled workers in the larger firms, can 
originate in different capital intensities (skilled workers work in more capital 
intensive sectors; larger companies are typically more capital intensive), scale 
advantages (employing skilled workers implies a substantial amount of fixed costs), 
the hierarchical structure (larger companies are structured more hierarchically,   12
requiring the employment of more managers) and the employees’ seniority (larger 
companies can offer more promotion and education possibilities and face a lower 
risk of bankruptcy, implying a higher level of seniority and subsequently higher 
wages) (Plasman et al., 2008).  
Next to size, also sector affiliation is found to drive a significant share of 
wage differences (see Plasman et al., 2008). A growing body of the literature 
investigates the underlying reasons behind this strong correlation. First, the weight 
of wage bargaining differs significantly between the sectors. In some sectors (e.g. 
sectors with a large share of small companies), sectoral bargaining is absent and 
wages are settled at the company level. Furthermore, some sectoral agreements only 
determine minimum wages, as increases in the actual wages are only negotiated at 
the company level. Therefore, a strong centralization of the wage bargaining process 
reduces wage differences. This argument is strongly linked with the second: 
different sectors exhibit different productivity and profit levels (Plasman et al., 
2006). Moreover, differences in the way the profit gains are redistributed in the 
company also drive inter-firm wage differences. Rusinek and Rycx (2008) find that, 
the more this redistribution occurs on the company level, the larger the wage 
differences become. A last argument is the power of unions: they can put pressure 
on companies to increase the wages and close sectoral wage gaps.  
In this paper we specifically look at R&D wages in the private sector. Typical 
factors influencing the general average wage level and dispersion are expected to 
play here, too, and interact with the factors explaining R&D activity. First, size 
seems to be an important driver of inter-firm
2 R&D wage differences: the annual 
R&D expenditure per R&D employee increases significantly with firm size 
(Czarnitzki et al., 2006). Also sector affiliation interacts with R&D wages. The 
annual R&D expenditure per R&D personnel and the share of personnel costs in the 
total R&D expenditure vary over the different sectors (Czarnitzki et al., 2006). 
Capital intensity is expected to have an impact, as well as the share of highly skilled 
employees. Productivity and, more specifically, R&D productivity may be 
correlated positively with R&D wages, as well as the level of international 
competition, and (foreign) group membership. Last, also the scope of the union’s 
                                                           
2 As only information about the average R&D wage is available, intra-firm R&D wage dispersion can not be investigated. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but remains an interesting and challenging issue for further research. 
   13
power in the wage bargaining process may generate inter-firm R&D wage 
differences. 
2.3. Hypotheses 
In the empirical part of this paper, I first assess the impact of public R&D 
funding on private R&D expenditure. In the next step, the typical testing of the 
crowding-out hypothesis in terms of R&D expenditure is extended with respect to 
the R&D workforce: if a subsidy stimulates private R&D expenditure, does this 
publicly induced increase in R&D expenditure generate additional R&D 
employment? In the last step, the wage structure is analysed with respect to R&D 
subsidies.  
The literature shows that long term effects may be significantly different from 
the effects found in the short run. However, this paper focuses on the short term 
effects; potential long term effects are beyond its scope and left for further research. 
3. Selectivity issue  
This section will explain more in detail the nature of the endogeneity problem, 
which may distort estimation results of the relationship between public R&D 
funding and R&D activity. Next, I briefly explain the methodology which will be 
employed to eliminate the potential bias caused by this selectivity problem. 
















=  ,   (1) 
where X represents a set of exogenous variables and β their respective parameters. S 
refers to the treatment status (S=1: treated; S=0: untreated – treatment is the receipt 
of a subsidy in this case) and α measures the impact of this treatment. U is the error 
term with zero mean and U is assumed to be uncorrelated with X. However, it is not 
unlikely that U is correlated with S: subsidized companies may well be more R&D 
active than the non-subsidized companies, even without the subsidy program. R&D 
                                                           
3 I omit firm indices for the sake of readability.   14
intensive firms may be more likely to receive an R&D subsidy as governments aim 
at maximizing the probability of success and therefore may well cherry-pick 
proposals of companies with considerable R&D expertise. Moreover, it is also quite 
possible that only particular companies apply for public R&D grants because they 
have an information advantage and are acquainted with policy measures they 
qualify for. In an experimental setting, without any selection bias and random 
subsidy allocation, U and S are not correlated. This is most likely not the case in 
current innovation policy practice, though. This would imply a selection bias in the 
estimation of the treatment effect. Therefore, standard econometric approaches, 
regressing Y on X and S by OLS, are not valid and other approaches, taking this 
potential endogeneity properly into account, should be employed. Econometric 
literature has developed a range of methods (see e.g. the surveys of Heckman et al., 
1999; Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000, 2002; Aerts et al., 2007). Examples of these 
methods are difference-in-differences estimations, matching, selection models and 
instrumental variable (IV) estimations (including simultaneous equation systems). I 
will apply the latter two methods in the empirical part. In the following paragraphs 
they are very briefly explained. 
The subsidy allocation can be modelled by the following selection equation: 
V Z S + = γ * , (2) 
where S* is an index, measuring the probability to receive public funding, 
depending on a set of company characteristics Z and their respective parameters γ, 
as well as an error term V. When S* is positive, the company is granted a subsidy:  
.    otherwise
0  S* if









The two-step selection model estimates two equations. A discrete choice 
model predicts the probability of being treated (S*) (the selection equation) and the 
outcome variable is regressed linearly on the treatment variable, controlling for 
observable exogenous characteristics (the outcome equation). Theoretically, the 
outcome equation is defined through the nonlinearity of the hazard parameter (also 
labelled as the inverse Mills ratio). However, in practice, most observations are 
located within the quasi-linear range of the hazard parameter (Puhani, 2000). Hence, 
to identify the treatment effect, an exclusion restriction is imposed. This requires the   15
existence of at least one variable, which is insignificant in the outcome equation, but 
at the same time significant in the selection equation. This regressor should not be 
correlated with the error term V of the selection equation. The selection model 
directly controls for the part of the error term U which is correlated with S. It is 
commonly assumed that U and V follow a joint normal distribution
4, resulting in the 
following conditional outcome equations: 
1
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where the last term in each equation represents the error term conditional on S. An 
important advantage of this methodology over matching lies exactly here: by 
separating the impact of S from the selection process, any correlation with 
unobserved variables is corrected for.  
This model has often been criticized as it is quite demanding on assumptions 
about the structure of the model. Therefore, the evaluation of the funding status is 
introduced in an IV framework. Moreover, while the application of treatment effects 
models is limited to binary treatment only, IV regressions allow refining the impact 
of the measure in a continuous treatment set-up
5. This will provide a further 
robustness check, as here not only the funding status, but now also the funding 
amount is taken into account.  
An instrument Z* is defined and a transformation g is applied, satisfying the 
requirement that g(Z*) is uncorrelated with U conditional on X, and that Z* is not 
completely determined by X. Unlike the selection model, IV is a simpler estimator 
as it omits the selection equation estimation. However, its major drawback lies in 
the identification of the instrument Z*: it has to be valid as well as relevant. Only in 
that case, the estimates will be consistent. Overidentifying restrictions are tested by 
the Hansen-Sargan test. Its joint null hypothesis claims that the instruments Z* are 
valid, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term U, and that the excluded instruments are 
rightfully excluded from the estimated equation. The identification of the equation, 
i.e. whether the excluded instruments are relevant, is tested in the Anderson 
                                                           
4 The assumption of joint normality of U and V can be relaxed, though. The interested reader is referred to Hussinger (2008). 
5 Most frequently, IV regressions are applied on discrete treatment variables. However, the same procedure is valid for 
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canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test. Its null hypothesis is that the equation is 
underidentified. Consequently, the potential endogeneity is adequately corrected for, 
if the Hansen-Sargan test holds and the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-
ratio test is rejected. Moreover, compliance with the Stable Unit Treatment Value 
Assumption (SUTVA) is required: the treatment of one firm should not affect the 
treatment effect on another firm (Rubin, 1990). Unfortunately this cannot be tested. 
4. The data  
This section first sketches the contextual framework. Next, I come to a 
description of the data and the variables which are employed in the empirical part. 
4.1. Contextual framework 
The particularities of public R&D funding and the process of wage settlement 
in Flanders are briefly explained.  
Public R&D funding in Flanders 
In Flanders, IWT, the Institute for the Promotion of Innovation through 
Science and Technology in Flanders, is the single counter where companies can 
apply for a subsidy. This implies that subsidies, at the Flemish and Belgian level, as 
well as certain EU-funded projects
6 are evaluated and granted through IWT. 
Accelerated depreciation for R&D capital assets and R&D tax allowances are 
available through the federal Belgian government. In contrast to most countries, the 
Belgian R&D tax allowances are fixed and not granted as a percentage: for each 
additional employee employed in scientific research, the company is granted a tax 
exemption for a fixed amount, in the year of recruitment. However, as Van 
Pottelsberghe et al. (2003) indicate, very few Belgian companies actually make use 
of these fiscal measures
7. Main reasons are a low level of acquaintance with the 
                                                           
6 The Framework Program projects are not managed through IWT. However, typically the scale of these projects is very large 
because these projects are often managed in international company consortia. As a result, the number of Flemish firms 
engaging in these programs is very limited. 
 
7 Due to recent changes in the Science and Technology Policy, this situation has changed, though. In the current system, fiscal 
measures, and more specifically tax credits for R&D personnel, are becoming increasingly popular. However, this is not 
relevant in the current paper, as our data was collected before the change.   17
system, complexity and high administration costs
8 and the fact that the measures are 
not significantly substantial
9. Direct R&D funding through IWT remains the largest 
source of public R&D grants in the private sector in Flanders
10.  
Wage settlement in Flanders 
In Flanders, wages are typically settled through collective bargaining. This 
usually occurs hierarchically, on three levels, which implies that bargaining at lower 
levels can only affect wages upwards (Plasman et al., 2007). At the top level, wages 
are settled through inter-sectoral agreements at the national level: minimum wages 
are fixed, as well as a margin for wage increases. Second, additional sectoral 
agreements may be negotiated, setting industry standards (minimum wages by 
category of worker) for most of the employees in the industry concerned. Finally, in 
a third bargaining round, single-employer agreements may be settled at the firm 
level. The bargaining process at the firm level has gained importance over time. 
Strong wage increases may reduce the national competitiveness and hence also 
reduce employment rates. Therefore, the government froze the private-sector wages 
several times; e.g. in 1996, a wage standard was introduced, imposing an upper 
limit to wage increases, coupled to the wage margins in France, Germany and the 
Netherlands. However, international comparisons reveal that labour is still 
significantly expensive in Flanders. Nevertheless, wage settlement in Flanders is far 
from a centralized and tight system and leaves considerable margin for inter-firm 
wage dispersion; Anglo-Saxon countries exhibit higher dispersion rates, while 
wages are distributed more equally in the Scandinavian countries (Plasman et al., 
2008). 
4.2. Variables 
The potential crowding-out effect of R&D subsidies in Flanders is addressed 
empirically with data from the biannual Research and Development Survey. This 
mainly quantitative survey covers most EU countries with a by and large 
                                                           
8 First, each year the company has to deliver a certificate. Second, the researcher should be full time employed in the research 
department of the same company to qualify. Third, the tax allowance is nominative, inducing a burden to keep track of all 
employees who benefited from the measure in the past. 
9 First, the amount of the exemption is not sufficiently significant. Second, the definition of highly qualified personnel is too 
strict, so that only very few employees qualify for the measure. Third, the tax exemption is a short term measure (it only 
relates to the first year of recruitment) while R&D typically is a long term process. 
10 The interested reader is referred to Aerts and Czarnitzki (2006) for a detailed overview of the public R&D funding system in 
Flanders.   18
harmonized questionnaire and the collected data are, among other things, used to 
compose the European Innovation Scoreboard (see e.g. PRO INNO EUROPE, 
2008). The set-up of the Flemish R&D survey is inventory-based: all potentially 
R&D active companies are identified and surveyed. In terms of R&D expenditure, 
the collected data cover a sample of companies, which are, in total, responsible for 
about 80% of the total R&D expenditure in Flanders (Debackere and Veugelers, 
2007). Therefore, the sample is close to the population of all R&D active companies 
in Flanders. I pool two consecutive waves, i.e. the 2004 and 2006 R&D surveys
11. 
The R&D data are supplemented with patent application data from the European 
Patent Office since 1978. Balance sheet data from the National Bank of Belgium 
(Belfirst) was merged to the dataset to provide financial indicators. Last, 
information on the subsidy size and history of each company was added: IWT keeps 
track of all subsidy applications and potential subsequent grants. 
The receipt of subsidies is denoted by a dummy variable (FUN) indicating 
whether the firm received public R&D funding. The amount of subsidies received is 
measured by AMT (in million EUR). No distinction is made with respect to the 
source which provided the public funding; the impact is an average effect over the 
different funding schemes.  
The outcome variables reflect a company’s R&D
12 activities. First, I test the 
impact of an R&D subsidy on R&D expenditure (RDX, in million EUR). As the 
distribution of RDX is highly skewed, the R&D expenditure intensity, RDXint 
(RDX / turnover * 100) is included as well. Second, I test how the R&D staffing 
changes when a subsidy is granted to a company. RDP is the number of R&D 
personnel (in full time equivalents, or FTEs). Again, to complete the picture of the 
impact of R&D subsidies on R&D activities in spite of the skewed distribution of 
R&D activities, R&D personnel intensities are calculated: RDPint (RDP / total 
number of employees * 100). The third set of outcome variables disentangles a 
company’s R&D expenditure into the share allocated to personnel costs on the one 
hand and the share allocated to all other costs (investments and operational costs) on 
                                                           
11 The data collected in the surveys refer to the period 2002-2004 (2004 survey) and 2004-2006 (2006 survey). The funding 
variables are measured in 2003 and 2005, respectively. To avoid endogeneity problems in the selection equation, the 
covariates are measured, whenever possible, at the beginning of the reference period. Only R&D active companies are kept for 
the analysis. 
12 R&D is defined in accordance with the Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002: 30): “creative work undertaken on a systematic 
basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of 
knowledge to devise new applications”. 
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the other hand. These variables are normalized by the number of R&D employees. 
Hence, RDX_P/RDP reflects the company’s R&D wage structure. RDX_O/RDP 
measures the R&D expenditure per R&D employee, leaving out the personnel costs. 
These variables will allow us to test whether potential additionality effects on the 
R&D expenditure are partially or fully absorbed by an increase in R&D staff wages. 
In that case, the effectiveness of the public R&D funding system could be 
questioned. The Flemish R&D activities are highly skewed. That is why one should 
also consider the logarithmically rescaled values of the measures of R&D activity: 
lnRDX and lnRDP; of course, also the amount of funding is rescaled in these 
models (lnAMT). 
In the literature on additionality assessment of public R&D funding, different 
authors have used different sets of exclusion restrictions and instrumental variables. 
Busom (2000) introduced selection models in additionality research and used the 
age of the company, reflecting its overall experience, as an exclusion restriction. 
She argues that more experienced firms are more aware of the value of innovation 
and may write better project proposals, both increasing the likelihood of receiving a 
subsidy. Kaiser (2004) uses a set of dummies reflecting competition (local, national 
or multinational orientation), ownership ((partly) publicly owned) and cooperation 
behaviour (external partners or academia involved in new product or process 
development). He argues that the firm may not care where the competition comes 
from, while governments may want to strengthen the technological competitiveness 
of domestic firms in the perspective of foreign competition. Moreover, the explicit 
policy aim of the Danish government to foster R&D cooperation may increase the 
likelihood that R&D cooperation projects are publicly funded. Ebersberger (2005) 
uses the share of R&D employees as exclusion restriction; as he uses a sample of 
innovative firms only, funding decisions have no influence on R&D status, but do 
influence the intensity of conducting R&D activity. Hussinger (2008) generates an 
artificial exclusion construct, including information on the legal form of the 
company, foreign ownership and the existence of an own R&D department within 
the company. Wallsten (2000) was the first to employ instrumental variable 
regressions. His instrument, the budget which is potentially available for a firm in a 
certain industry or technological area, has become very popular and was picked up 
by several authors (Hyytinen and Toivanen, 2005; Clausen, 2007 and Ali-Yrkkö,   20
2004 and 2005). Ali-Yrkkö (2004) additionally experimented with the amount of 
funding the company has applied for in the year of the funding receipt. Aerts and 
Czarnitzki (2006) use the number of past project applications. Suetens (2002) and 
Gonzáles et al. (2005) introduce the lagged value of the subsidy as instrumental 
variable in their regression.  
Building on the existing research summarized above, I introduce two new 
variables. They are supposed to have an impact on the funding status, but not on the 
outcome. In the treatment effects model they serve as excluded explanatory 
variables in the outcome regressions, which are significant in the selection equation, 
though. In the IV-set-up, they provide a vector of instruments. They are computed 
from the company’s subsidy history. AMT/PROJ_past5yrs (in million EUR) 
contains the total public R&D funding the company received in the preceding five 
years, divided by the number of projects in this period. PROJ/EMP_past5yrs (in 
number / FTE) is a count variable, reflecting the total number of project proposals 
per employee each company submitted in order to obtain an R&D subsidy in the 
preceding five years. These variables seem to be reliable instruments, since they are 
highly correlated with a company’s current funding status but at the same time, the 
company’s current R&D activity does not influence its subsidy history. To obtain 
the right fit in the estimate dimensions, also the logarithmic transformations of these 
variables (lnAMT/PROJ_past5yrs and lnPROJ/EMP_past5yrs) were used in the 
respective models. 
I use several control variables which may affect both the subsidy receipt and 
R&D effort. Including the number of employees allows controlling for size effects, 
which are empirically often found to explain innovativeness (see e.g. Veugelers and 
Cassiman, 1999). Moreover, the Flemish S&T policy puts high value on R&D 
activities performed by small and medium sized companies. Therefore, the size 
variable is also expected to influence the subsidy receipt. The logarithmic 
transformation (lnEMP) is used to avoid potential estimation biases caused by 
skewness of the data.  
Another important variable is the firms' patent stock (PAT). As I use data 
from two cross-sectional datasets, which do not include time-series information, the 
patent stock enables us to control for previous (successful) R&D activities. 
Obviously, not all innovation efforts lead to patents, which Griliches (1990: 1669)   21
formulated nicely as “not all inventions are patentable, not all inventions are 
patented”. Likewise, not all patented innovations result from R&D activities; the 
R&D process is only part of a company’s innovative activity
13. Moreover, the 
propensity to patent may be heterogeneous among firms. However, as data on 
previous R&D expenditure are not available, the patent stock is the best 
approximation of past innovation activities. I use all patent information in the EPO 
database and generate the stock of patents for each firm as the depreciated sum of 
all patents filed at the EPO from 1978 until 2001(1997):  
t t t PATA PAT PAT + − = −1 ) 1 ( δ ,   (5) 
where PAT is the patent stock of a firm in period t and t-1, respectively, PATA are 
the number of patent applications filed at the EPO and δ is a constant depreciation 
rate of knowledge which is set to 0.15 as common in the literature (see e.g. Jaffe, 
1986; Griliches and Mairesse, 1984). On the one hand, firms that exhibit previous 
successful innovation projects indicated by patents, are more likely to receive public 
R&D funding, because public authorities may follow the ‘picking-the-winner’ 
principle in order to minimize the expected failure rates of the innovation projects, 
and hence, to maximize the expected benefit for the society. On the other hand, the 
patent stock controls for the past average innovative engagement of the firms, 
because it is expected that firms that were highly innovative in the past will 
continue this strategy. The patents are counted only until 2001(1997), to ensure that 
the stock definitely refers to past innovation activities, in order to avoid a 
simultaneous equation bias in the regression analysis. The patent stock enters into 
the regression as patent stock per employee (PAT/EMP) to reduce the potential 
multicollinearity with firm size. 
The export quota (EXQU = exports / turnover) measures the degree of 
international competition a firm faces. Firms that engage in foreign markets may be 
more innovative than others and, hence, would be more likely to apply for subsidies.  
Next, variables reflecting the technological and financial quality of the 
company may play a significant part in both the subsidy and R&D story. These 
characteristics are proxied by capital intensity (CAPint) as the value of fixed assets 
                                                           
13 Innovative activity is defined as “all those scientific, technological, organisational, financial and commercial steps which 
actually, or are intended to, lead to the implementation of technologically new or improved products or processes” 
(OECD/Eurostat, 1997: 10).   22
per employee and cash-flow (CASHF) (both in million EUR) respectively. Both 
variables are obtained from balance sheet records provided by the National Bank of 
Belgium (through the Belfirst database). CASHF is also divided by the number of 
employees (CASHF/EMP) to avoid multicollinearity with firm size.  
A dummy variable indicating whether a firm belongs to a group (GROUP) 
controls for different governance structures. Firms belonging to a group may be 
more likely to receive subsidies because they presumably have better access to 
information about governmental actions due to their network linkages. In addition to 
group membership, FOREIGN indicates whether this group is domestic or foreign-
owned. Foreign affiliates may be more likely to apply for a subsidy in their home 
country. Twelve industry dummies (BR) are included to allow for differences 
between sectors. On the one hand, some sectors may exhibit a larger R&D intensity. 
On the other hand, governments may favour certain sectors in their R&D policy, 
which increases the likelihood of receiving subsidies for firms in these industries. 
From the theoretical evidence on R&D wages, different factors are derived 
which could possibly drive inter-firm dispersion. Most of these are already reflected 
in the variables described above. Size (lnEMP) and sector (BR) may determine 
R&D wages. Also capital intensity is expected to have an impact. Productivity and 
more specifically R&D productivity may be correlated positively with R&D wages. 
This productivity is captured by the patent stock (PAT/EMP). Internationally 
competing firms may pay higher wages (EXQU). Moreover, also group membership 
(GROUP) and foreign ownership (FOREIGN) may play. Besides these variables, 
which are also included in the models assessing the impact of public funding on 
R&D expenditure and R&D employment, two other variables are defined to refine 
the assessment of additionality effects on R&D wages. First, the percentage of 
highly skilled employees is included as the share of R&D employees with a doctoral 
or university degree (UNI). Second, the impact of the union in the wage bargaining 
process may be an influencing factor. This parameter is computed following 
Vandenbussche et al. (2001). The idea is to maximise the union’s utility function 
L w L w U . ) , ( = , explained by wages w and employment L, with respect to the 
wages:  
) 1 ( .
β β π
− = Ω     U    Max
w  .   (6)   23
The parameter β reflects the bargaining strength of the union, and has a value 
between zero, i.e. in the absence of a union: all rents are absorbed by the firm, and 
unit value, i.e. with a ‘monopoly union’: the union determines the wages 









+ = , (7) 
where the employee’s wage is the sum of his alternative wage w
a and a fraction of 
the firm’s profit per employee π
0/L
0. For each sector, an unbalanced firm-level 
panel was constructed, containing balance sheet information from the National 
Bank of Belgium (Belfirst), covering all Belgian firms in the sector, with non-
missing values for the period 1998-2006. The profit π
0/L
0 was computed as the 
value added minus the labour costs, divided by the number of employees, and 
normalized by the consumer price index (obtained from Eurostat, 2008). The 
average wage w was generated dividing the total labour costs of the firm by the 
number of employees. The alternative wage w
a was set to zero
14. As this model may 
be subject to endogeneity, the regression is instrumented by the profit per employee 




1 / − − t t L π  and year dummies. The monetary values were 
deflated (EconStats, 2007). Table 2 shows the estimated bargaining power 
coefficients β for the sectors in the dataset. Parameter β is additionally included in 









                                                           
14 Vandenbussche et al. (2001) alternatively suggest to set the alternative wage w
a at the sectoral minimum wage, but as this 
did not change their results, I also use a zero value for w
a. 
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Table 2: Estimated bargaining power coefficients 
Nace  β 
Number of 
companies   Nace  β 
Number of 
companies 
All sectors  0.0623  224613             
Manufacturing 0.0890  148564    27 0.1015  3794 
15 0.1172  22345    271 0.0636  1565 
16 n.s.  184    274 0.1415  765 
17 0.0993  8355    28 0.0693 29427 
18 0.1617  4819    29 0.0481 12105 
19 0.1130  945    30 n.s.  941 
20 0.1007  9113    31 n.s.  5270 
21 n.s.  2913    32 n.s.  2463 
22 0.0322  15396    321 n.s.  827 
23 0.1885  352    33 n.s.  4240 
24 0.1343  6971    34 n.s.  3276 
244 0.1160  1358    351 0.1209  752 
25 0.1108  6288    353 n.s.  283 
26 0.0689  9367    355 n.s.  152 
Services 0.0146  76049        
72 0.0325  18893        
722 n.s.  10603        
73 n.s.  1185        
74 0.0489  39684*        
*To facilitate computation, for sector 74 only a randomly selected subset of the total population (110846) companies 
was used. Note: in the models only twelve industry dummies are included, as some sectors were aggregated. However, 
as information on the exact 2-digit (for some subgroups 3-digit) sector affiliation is known for the companies, I 
decided to use all available information. 
 
To test the presence of upskilling effects, a subgroup of the total R&D 
personnel, i.e. researchers (RDPR, in FTE) as well as the share of these researchers 
in the total R&D staff (RDPR/RDP, in %) are included as dependent variables. 
As I use data from two pooled cross-sections and the average R&D expenditure was 
subject to a downward trend (see e.g. Debackere and Veugelers, 2007), a year 
dummy (YEAR=1 for the R&D 2006 wave) was included in each regression to 
control for differences over time. Moreover, the monetary variables
15 were deflated 
(EconStats, 2007). Extreme outliers with respect to the funding amount, R&D 
expenditure, R&D personnel and R&D wages were removed. The final sample 
consists of 470 observations. The summary statistics of the variables used to 
evaluate the input additionality of Flemish R&D subsidies are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics dataset 
 All  companies   
  #  Obs.  Mean  St.  Dev.  Min.  Max.       
TREATMENT VARIABLES                 
FUN  (dummy)  470  0.3957  0.4895  0 1       
AMT  (in  mio  EUR)  470  0.0744  0.1761  0  1.3284       
  Funded companies  Non-funded companies 
  # Obs.  Mean  St. Dev.  Min.  Max.  # Obs.  Mean  St. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
OUTCOME  VARIABLES                 
RDX  (in  mio  EUR)  186  0.9122  1.1911  0.0074  5.6797  284  0.5375 0.7699 0.0092 5.6544 
RDXint  (in  %)  186  0.0987  0.1509  0.0004  0.7219  284  0.0499 0.0984 0.0000 0.7635 
RDP (in FTE)  186  11.9277  14.8525  0.2000  72.4000  284  7.1340  9.8024  0.1000  79.8000 
RDPint (in %)  186  0.2228  0.2586  0.0053  1  284  0.1321  0.1970  0.0019  1 
RDX_P/RDP (in mio EUR / FTE)  186  0.0538  0.0282  0.0129  0.2157  284  0.0528  0.0290  0.0118  0.2118 
RDX_O/RDP (in mio EUR / FTE)  186  0.0265  0.0258  0  0.1267  284  0.0217  0.0284  0  0.1800 
INSTRUMENTS                 
AMT/PROJ_past5yrs (in mio EUR)  186  0.0157  0.0579  0  0.5462  284  0.0014  0.0091  0  0.0889 
PROJ/EMP_past5yrs (in number / FTE)  186  0.1355  0.3216  0  2.7500  284  0.0412  0.1710  0  2.0000 
CONTROL VARIABLES                 
lnEMP  (in  FTE)  186  4.0436  1.5037  0.69315  8.1928  284  4.2080  1.3968 0.69315 7.6159 
PAT/EMP (in number / FTE)  186  0.4613  1.1672  0  7.2847  284  0.2882  0.9227  0  8.7338 
EXQU (in %)  186  0.6135  0.3412  0  1  284  0.5768  0.3444  0  1 
CAPint (in mio EUR / FTE)  186  134.8062  490.8716  1.26242  4856.3270  284  80.9283  125.6292  0.37779  790.2966 
CASHF/EMP (in mio EUR / FTE)  186  16.0572  45.0683  -181.41  325.5137  284  17.3998  47.6177  -509.71  400.9867 
GROUP (dummy)  186  0.5645  0.4972  0  1  284  0.6549  0.4762  0  1 
FOREIGN (dummy)  186  0.2204  0.4157  0  1  284  0.2465  0.4317  0  1 
YEAR (dummy)  186  0.5161  0.5011  0  1  284  0.5317  0.4999  0  1 
ADDITIONAL VARIABLES                 
UNI* (in %)  171  0.5874  0.2911  0  1  256  0.5700  0.3218  0  1 
BARG  (index)  186  0.0490  0.0485  0  0.1617 284  0.0629  0.0504 0 0.1885 
RDPR** (in FTE)  175  7.0906  10.6564  0  60.0000  266  3.9445  6.5300  0  48.0000 
RDPR/RDP** (in %)  175  0.5803  0.3229  0  1  266  0.5581  0.3479  0  1 
Note: the details of BR are not presented here. To compute the logarithmic transformation values of AMT, RDX, RDP, AMT/PROJ_past5yrs and PROJ/EMP_past5yrs, zero values 
before the transformation were replaced by the minimum observed logarithmic value after the transformation. 
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5. Estimates 
This section presents empirical evidence on the impact of R&D subsidies on 
R&D expenditure, employment and wages in Flanders. I employ parametric 
treatment effects models as well as IV regression models. First, the impact of the 
funding status is evaluated in a treatment effects framework. Table 4 reports the 
estimates of the selection equations. The amount of funding received as well as the 
number of projects submitted in the past are highly significant in the selection 
equation; they strongly influence the likelihood to receive public R&D funding in 
Flanders. This seems to indicate that there is a high level of continuity in the receipt 
of public funding. 
Table 4: Treatment effects model: selection equations 
  Probit estimates  Marginal effects  Probit estimates  Marginal effects 
AMT/PROJ_past5yrs  17.2055 (5.1059) ***  6.6760 (2.0125)  ***             
PROJ/EMP_past5yrs  0.9137 (0.3595) **  0.3545 (0.1397)  **             
lnAMT/PROJ_past5yrs            0.1958 (0.0953)  **  0.0742 (0.0363)  ** 
lnPROJ/EMP_past5yrs            0.2473 (0.0310)  ***  0.0937 (0.0117)  *** 
lnEMP  0.0407  (0.0625)     0.0158  (0.0242)     0.0904  (0.0639)     0.0343  (0.0242)    
PAT/EMP  0.0268  (0.0680)     0.0104  (0.0264)     -0.0099  (0.0694)     -0.0038  (0.0263)    
EXQU 0.3598  (0.2057)  *  0.1396 (0.0799)  *  0.3752 (0.2188) *  0.1422  (0.0829) * 
CAPint  0.0005  (0.0003)     0.0002  (0.0001)     0.0006  (0.0004)     0.0002  (0.0002)    
CASHF/EMP  -0.0003  (0.0014)     -0.0001  (0.0006)     -0.0001  (0.0015)     0.0000  (0.0006)    
GROUP°  -0.2299  (0.1528)     -0.0896  (0.0596)     -0.0540  (0.1637)     -0.0205  (0.0623)    
FOREIGN°  -0.2347  (0.1767)     -0.0894  (0.0658)     -0.1949  (0.1852)     -0.0725  (0.0673)    
YEAR°  -0.0572  (0.1261)     -0.0222  (0.0489)     -0.0759  (0.1325)     -0.0288  (0.0502)    
CONSTANT  -1.0552 (0.3649) ***        1.2089 (0.6561)  *     
BR  χ²(11) = 20.13  **        χ²(11) = 14.72       
Log-Likelihood  -278.8042     -247.2025    
Pseudo  R²  0.1163     0.2164    
#  obs.  470     470    
° dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%) 
The standard errors (between brackets) are obtained by the delta method. 
 
Next, the outcome equations are estimated, taking the estimated coefficients 
from the selection equation (Table 4) into account. In doing so, the actual treatment 
effect is separated from the potential selection bias (in the HAZARD coefficient). In 
Table 5 the outcome estimates are presented. The receipt of a public R&D grant 
clearly has a positive impact on a company’s R&D effort.  
The results confirm positive additionality effects of R&D subsidies on R&D 
expenditure in Flanders, which is in line with previous analyses for Flanders (Aerts   27
and Czarnitzki, 2004 and 2006 as well as Aerts and Schmidt, 2008). Funded 
companies spend more (RDX***) on R&D than their non-funded counterparts. 
Also, funding is positively correlated with the company’s R&D expenditure 
intensity (RDXint***). However, as David and Hall (2000) put forward well-
founded, this significantly positive impact on R&D expenditure may well be fully 
absorbed merely by researcher wage increases if the labour supply of R&D staffing 
is inelastic. Additional R&D expenditure would then not be translated into more 
R&D activity. The current analysis allows completing the additionality picture with 
information on the impact of public R&D grants on R&D employment and wages. 
First, we look at the impact on R&D staffing. Table 5 shows that similar companies 
with an opposite funding status significantly differ in terms of the R&D personnel 
they employ: the number of R&D employees (RDP***) as well as R&D personnel 
intensity (RDPint***) are significantly higher after the receipt of a subsidy. Hence, 
in Flanders, public R&D funding is actually translated into more R&D activity. 
These results suggest that the supply of R&D personnel in Flanders is not fully 
inelastic: companies are able to attract more R&D personnel when they have a 
larger R&D human resources budget at their disposal. This result contrasts with the 
findings of Suetens (2002), who could not provide evidence to support positive 
additionality effects of R&D subsidies to Flemish companies, evaluating the R&D 
staffing employed. This may, however, be due to the fact that the dataset as well as 
the analysis framework differ significantly (see David and Hall, 2000). Lastly, we 
turn to the potential impact of public R&D funding on a company’s R&D wages 
(RDX_P/RDP). The estimates reveal that, in addition to a significantly positive 
impact on R&D expenditure and R&D staffing, also the wage structure reacts to an 
R&D subsidy: the average personnel cost per R&D employee (RDX_P/RDP*) 
increases, while the average operational costs and investments per R&D employee 
(RDX_O/RDP) do not change.    28
Table 5: Treatment effects model: outcome equations 
Table 6: IV regressions on the receipt of a subsidy 







HAZARD  -0.5911 (0.1968) ***  -0.0349 (0.0141) **  -6.7083 (2.4905) ***  -0.0524 (0.0230) **  -0.0114 (0.0067) *  -0.0027 (0.0062)  
FUN  1.2007 (0.3180) ***  0.0768 (0.0217) ***  14.0455 (4.0166) ***  0.1259 (0.0352) ***  0.0181 (0.0108) *  0.0101 (0.0099)  
lnEMP  0.3247 (0.0370) ***  -0.0273 (0.0044) ***  4.2379 (0.4671) ***  -0.0849 (0.0071) ***  0.0032 (0.0012) **  0.0003 (0.0011)  
PAT/EMP  0.0292 (0.0415)   0.0019 (0.0048)   0.5808 (0.5240)   0.0062 (0.0078)   -0.0012 (0.0014)   -0.0015 (0.0013)  
EXQU  0.0855 (0.1358)   0.0471 (0.0154) ***  0.4880 (1.7134)   0.1032 (0.0251) *** 0.0060  (0.0046)    0.0086 (0.0042) ** 
CAPint  0.0004 (0.0001) **  -0.0000 (0.0000)   0.0031 (0.0018) *  -0.0000 (0.0000)   -0.0000 (0.0000)   0.0000 (0.0000)  
CASHF/EMP  0.0031 (0.0009) ***  0.0001 (0.0001)   0.0220 (0.0113) *  0.0005 (0.0002) ***  0.0001 (0.0000) *  0.0001 (0.0000) *** 
GROUP  0.1728 (0.1007) *  0.0191 (0.0116) *  1.5964 (1.2699)   0.0253 (0.0188)   0.0045 (0.0034)   0.0082 (0.0031) *** 
FOREIGN  0.2157 (0.1070) **  0.0138 (0.0126)   1.7087 (1.3500)   0.0076 (0.0205)   0.0042 (0.0036)   -0.0006 (0.0033)  
YEAR  -0.0203 (0.0790)   -0.0054 (0.0093)   0.6038 (0.9964)   0.0075 (0.0152)   -0.0055 (0.0027) **  -0.0010 (0.0024)  
CONSTANT  -1.6781 (0.2228) ***  0.0801 (0.0256) ***  -19.5058 (2.8099) ***  0.3632 (0.0416) ***  0.0161 (0.0075) **  0.0070 (0.0069)  
BR  χ²(11) = 42.07  ***  χ²(11) = 110.11  ***  χ²(11) = 51.83  ***  χ²(11) = 99.68  ***  χ²(11) =31.82  ***  χ²(11) = 14.92   
Note: the industry dummy coefficients are not shown here; the test on their joint significance is reported, though. The standard errors (between brackets) are heteroskedasticly consistent. 
The selection equation includes: 
a AMT/PROJ_past5yrs and PROJ/EMP_past5yrs - 
b lnAMT/PROJ_past5yrs and lnPROJ/EMP_past5yrs. Number of obs.: 470. 







FUN  1.1852 (0.4087) ***  0.0797 (0.0273) ***  11.7621 (5.3633) **  0.1581 (0.0837) *  0.0290 (0.0128) **  0.0124 (0.0085)  
lnEMP  0.3247 (0.0431) ***  -0.0273 (0.0044) ***  4.2396 (0.5819) ***  -0.0850 (0.0092) ***  0.0032 (0.0013) **  0.0003 (0.0010)  
PAT/EMP  0.0297 (0.0384)   0.0018 (0.0036)   0.6619 (0.4653)   0.0051 (0.0060)   -0.0016 (0.0011)   -0.0016 (0.0014)  
EXQU  0.0879 (0.1412)   0.0466 (0.0181) ***  0.8282 (1.6535)   0.0984 (0.0288) *** 0.0044  (0.0055)    0.0082 (0.0044) * 
CAPint  0.0004 (0.0001) ***  -0.0000 (0.0000)   0.0035 (0.0018) **  -0.0000 (0.0000)   -0.0000 (0.0000)   0.0000 (0.0000)  
CASHF/EMP  0.0031 (0.0013) **  0.0001 (0.0002)   0.0217 (0.0135)   0.0005 (0.0003) **  0.0001 (0.0000) *  0.0001 (0.0000) ** 
GROUP  0.1713 (0.0855) **  0.0194 (0.0123)   1.3773 (1.1210)   0.0284 (0.0198)   0.0056 (0.0035)   0.0084 (0.0032) *** 
FOREIGN  0.2151 (0.1270) *  0.0139 (0.0146)   1.6280 (1.5233)   0.0088 (0.0198)   0.0046 (0.0038)   -0.0005 (0.0036)  
YEAR  -0.0207 (0.0772)   -0.0053 (0.0089)   0.5518 (0.9572)   0.0082 (0.0154)   -0.0052 (0.0029) *  -0.0009 (0.0024)  
CONSTANT  -1.6748 (0.2538) ***  0.0795 (0.0213) ***  -19.0212 (3.3051) ***  0.3563 (0.0547) ***  0.0138 (0.0069) **  0.0065 (0.0065)  
BR  χ²(11) = 48.26  ***  χ²(11) = 83.70  ***  χ²(11) = 59.97  ***  χ²(11) = 95.06  ***  χ²(11) = 32.25  ***  χ²(11) = 14.86   
Instrument tests:                   
Anderson   χ²(2) = 21.518  ***  χ²(2) = 103.293  ***  χ²(2) = 21.518  ***  χ²(2) = 21.518  ***  χ²(2) = 21.518  ***  χ²(2) = 21.518  *** 
Hansen-Sargan  χ²(1) = 1.141    χ²(1) = 0.032    χ²(1) = 0.430    χ²(1) = 1.050    χ²(1) = 0.001    χ²(1) = 1.814   
Centered  R²  0.2689  0.3561   0.3200   0.4736   -0.1040    0.1038  
Note: the industry dummy coefficients are not shown here; the test on their joint significance is reported, though. The standard errors (between brackets) are heteroskedasticly consistent.  
The instruments used are: 
a AMT/PROJ_past5yrs and PROJ/EMP_past5yrs – 
b lnAMT/PROJ_past5yrs and lnPROJ/EMP_past5yrs. Number of obs.: 470.   29
The parametric treatment effects models reveal that the Flemish R&D policy stimulates 
private R&D activity, both in terms of expenditure and employment. In a next step, the 
evaluation of the funding status (FUN) is introduced in an IV framework. As discussed 
before, both the amount of funding received and the number of projects submitted by the 
company in the preceding five years are expected to be reliable instruments in an IV approach 
of the additionality issue. Table 6 shows the regression results. The coefficient of FUN is 
again highly significant and positive for R&D expenditure, personnel, intensity and wages. 
Moreover, the tests on the quality of the instrumental variables confirm that the model 
requirements hold. Compared to the treatment effects model, the coefficients are very similar.  
In the last step, I extend the analysis of the funding status and take the amount of 
funding (AMT) into account. This enables a more profound insight into the nature of the 
additionality effects found in the discrete models. These latter models reject full crowding-out 
effects. However, it is still possible that funded companies to some extent replace private 
money with the public grant. This would mean that a subsidy partially crowds out companies’ 
private R&D effort.  
Again, funding is instrumented with both the amount of funding received and the 
number of projects submitted by the company in the preceding five years. The estimates for 
different R&D expenditure measures are presented in Table 7. The coefficient of AMT is 
highly significant and positive. Moreover, the tests on the quality of the instrumental variables 
confirm that the model requirements hold. A subsidy of 1 million EUR increases the average 
R&D expenditure with 1.793 million EUR. The Flemish R&D activities are highly skewed, 
however. That is why one should also consider lnRDX and RDXint. The coefficients of the 
log-log specification can be interpreted as elasticities. Here, the picture looks a little less 
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Table 7: IV regression: R&D expenditure 




AMT  1.7927  (0.6528) ***            
lnAMT       0.1244 (0.0268)  ***  0.0114 (0.0039)  *** 
lnEMP  0.3044 (0.0390)  ***  0.4950 (0.0421)  ***  -0.0282 (0.0043)  *** 
PAT/EMP  -0.0244 (0.0502)    0.0605 (0.0373)    -0.0020 (0.0036)   
EXQU 0.1703  (0.1170)    0.8621  (0.1401) ***  0.0512  (0.0181) *** 
CAPint  0.0006 (0.0001)  ***  0.0002 (0.0001)  ***  -0.0000 (0.0000)   
CASHF/EMP  0.0034 (0.0011)  ***  0.0034 (0.0011)  ***  0.0002 (0.0002)   
GROUP  0.0666 (0.0599)    0.2690 (0.1045)  **  0.0164 (0.0120)   
FOREIGN  0.1464 (0.1065)    0.0546 (0.1218)    0.0102 (0.0145)   
YEAR  0.0315 (0.0673)    0.1417 (0.0889)    0.0034 (0.0095)   
CONSTANT  -1.3650 (0.1932)  ***  -3.8667 (0.2830)  ***  0.1642 (0.0342)  *** 
BR  χ²(11) = 50.26  ***  χ²(11) = 173.01  ***  χ²(11) = 85.32  *** 
Instrument tests:                
Anderson   χ²(2) = 97.635  ***  χ²(2) = 215.930  ***  χ²(2) = 215.930  *** 
Hansen-Sargan  χ²(1) = 0.983    χ²(1) = 0.318    χ²(1) = 0.310   
Centered R²  0.5134    0.5572    0.3777   
Note: the industry dummy coefficients are not shown here; the test on their joint significance is reported, though. The 
instruments used are: 
a AMT/PROJ_past5yrs and PROJ/EMP_past5yrs - 
b lnAMT/PROJ_past5yrs and 
lnPROJ/EMP_past5yrs. The standard errors (between brackets) are heteroskedasticly consistent. Number of obs.: 470. 
 
Also the evaluation of the impact of public funding on R&D employment leads to 
similar results as the discrete treatment analyses. Again, the absolute increase is very high: a 
subsidy of 1 million EUR would result in the hiring of 17 additional R&D employees. The 
elasticity is 11%.  
Table 8: IV regression: R&D employment 




AMT 17.2735  (9.7748)  *             
lnAMT       0.1069  (0.0242)  ***  0.0166  (0.0057)  *** 
lnEMP 4.0445  (0.5595)  ***  -0.5784  (0.0390)  ***  -0.0863  (0.0087)  *** 
PAT/EMP 0.1519  (0.6825)    0.0821  (0.0362)  **  0.0010  (0.0060)   
EXQU 1.6734  (1.4056)    0.5722  (0.1202) ***  0.1112  (0.0255) *** 
CAPint 0.0055  (0.0013)  ***  0.0002  (0.0001)  *  0.0000  (0.0000)   
CASHF/EMP 0.0245  (0.0134)  *  0.0018  (0.0009)  **  0.0006  (0.0002)  ** 
GROUP 0.3353  (0.8877)    0.1273  (0.0929)    0.0200  (0.0186)   
FOREIGN 0.9537  (1.4098)    0.0563  (0.1109)    0.0020  (0.0185)   
YEAR 1.0472  (0.9753)    0.2027  (0.0813)  **  0.0199  (0.0148)   
CONSTANT -15.9628  (2.6074)  ***  -0.4785  (0.2496)  *  0.4891  (0.0550)  *** 
BR  χ²(11) = 62.38  ***  χ²(11) = 190.68  ***  χ²(11) = 120.75  *** 
Instrument tests:                  
Anderson   χ²(2) = 97.635  ***  χ²(2) = 215.930  ***  χ²(2) = 215.930  *** 
Hansen-Sargan  χ²(1) = 0.919    χ²(1) = 0.986    χ²(1) = 1.118   
Centered R²  0.4588    0.6479    0.5282   
Note: the industry dummy coefficients are not shown here; the test on their joint significance is reported, though. The 
instruments used are: 
a AMT/PROJ_past5yrs and PROJ/EMP_past5yrs - 
b lnAMT/PROJ_past5yrs and 
lnPROJ/EMP_past5yrs. The standard errors (between brackets) are heteroskedasticly consistent. Number of obs.: 470. 
 
Table 9 confirms the earlier conclusion that also the wage structure is influenced by the 
R&D subsidy policy in Flanders. In the first model, only variables used in the models for 
RDX and RDP are included. The second model additionally includes two variables which 
may also exert a particular influence on R&D wages, i.e. the share of highly skilled R&D 
employees (UNI) and the union’s strength in the wage bargaining process (BARG). The   31
composition of the workforce (UNI***) indeed seems to drive a share of inter-firm wage 
dispersion, but the union (BARG) does not significantly affect R&D wages. This is not too 
surprising, as R&D employees are typically white-collar workers, who often receive pay 
supplements outside of collective agreements (Rusinek and Rycx, 2008). Therefore, the 
union’s bargaining power is not relevant. This was already suggested in Table 2, where the 
bargaining power is less significant in sector 73: Research and Development. Obviously, the 
bargaining power is calculated from the total population of employees, but the share of R&D 
employees is expected to be high in this sector.  
Table 9: IV regression: R&D wage structure 
   ---------RDX_P/RDP 
a --------- ---------RDX_P/RDP
 b --------- --------RDX_O/RDP 
a -------- 
AMT  0.0370  (0.0138) ***  0.0357 (0.0153)  **  0.0079 (0.0101)     
UNI       0.0124 (0.0050)  **      
BARG       0.0852 (0.0787)        
lnEMP  0.0028  (0.0012) **  0.0028 (0.0013)  **  0.0002 (0.0010)   
PAT/EMP  -0.0026  (0.0014) *  -0.0029 (0.0017)  *  -0.0016 (0.0014)   
EXQU  0.0068  (0.0048)   0.0037 (0.0050)   0.0097  (0.0042) ** 
CAPint  -0.0000  (0.0000)   -0.0000 (0.0000)    0.0000 (0.0000)   
CASHF/EMP  0.0001  (0.0000) **  0.0001 (0.0000)  **  0.0001 (0.0000)  ** 
GROUP  0.0030  (0.0030)   0.0042 (0.0030)    0.0072 (0.0030)  ** 
FOREIGN  0.0030  (0.0035)   0.0020 (0.0036)    -0.0011 (0.0036)   
YEAR  -0.0043  (0.0028)   -0.0038 (0.0029)    -0.0009 (0.0024)   
CONSTANT  0.0211  (0.0060) ***  0.0059 (0.0115)    0.0094 (0.0061)   
BR  χ²(11) = 34.73  ***  χ²(11) = 29.57  ***  χ²(11) = 13.91   
Instrument tests:                  
Anderson   χ²(2) = 97.635  ***  χ²(2) = 81.767  ***  χ²(2) = 97.635  *** 
Hansen-Sargan  χ²(1) = 1.194    χ²(1) = 1.166    χ²(1) = 2.719   
Centered R²  0.0762    0.0877    0.1101   
Note: the industry dummy coefficients are not shown here; the test on their joint significance is reported, though. The 
instruments used are AMT/PROJ_past5yrs and PROJ/EMP_past5yrs. The standard errors (between brackets) are 




So, bringing the results together, it is clear that public R&D funding induces additional 
R&D expenditure. Moreover, funded companies enlarge their R&D workforce. However, at 
the same time, the average R&D wage increases. Two potential explanations are advanced. 
On the one hand, the R&D wage increase may not involve any difference in productivity and 
result from an inelastic R&D labour supply. However, as the increase in R&D personnel after 
receiving a subsidy is considerable, the R&D labour supply in Flanders seems not to be fully 
inelastic. On the other hand, this R&D wage increase could signal an ‘upskilling’ process, i.e. 
the R&D workforce composition is shifted upwards with respect to its qualification. As only 
information on the average R&D wage is available, it is not possible to directly test this 
hypothesis. However, to some extent, a change in workforce composition can be assessed 
through other approximating variables. First, we look at the number of researchers. Compared 
with technicians and other R&D employees, it can be expected that they typically are more   32
likely to be highly skilled. If we take into account that the total number of R&D employees 
increased with about 17.3 FTEs and compare this to the increase in the number of researchers 
only, which is about 16.7 (see RDPR in Table 10), it appears that the increase in R&D 
employment mainly comes from an increase in researchers. Further analyses (not shown here) 
indeed confirm that there is no significant increase in the number of technicians and other 
R&D employees. Second, I assess the impact of the subsidy on the share of researchers in the 
total R&D workforce (see RDPR/RDP in Table 10). Also here, a significantly positive impact 
can be found. In a cautious conclusion, one could therefore collect some evidence that the 
increase in R&D wages is not that detrimental, as the quality of the R&D employees tends to 
increase, which in turn increases the quality of the R&D activity, as well as the expected 
output. 
Table 10: IV regression: number of researchers and their share in the total R&D 
workforce 
   ---------RDPR
 --------- ---------RDPR/RDP
 --------- 
AMT  16.7069 (7.6660)  **  0.3719 (0.1273)  *** 
lnEMP  2.5592 (0.4882)  ***  -0.0284 (0.0143)  ** 
PAT/EMP  0.2066 (0.5348)    0.0146 (0.0159)   
EXQU 0.4368  (1.1295)   0.0322  (0.0564)   
CAPint  0.0010 (0.0007)    -0.0000 (0.0000)   
CASHF/EMP  0.0192 (0.0100)  *  0.0002 (0.0002)   
GROUP  0.1144 (0.6702)    0.0130 (0.0397)   
FOREIGN  -0.0039 (1.0194)    -0.0161 (0.0409)   
YEAR  0.9278 (0.7326)    0.0604 (0.0320)  * 
CONSTANT  -10.5676 (2.0651)  ***  0.6360 (0.0859)  *** 
BR  χ²(11) = 47.62  ***  χ²(11) = 12.59   
Instrument tests:            
Anderson   χ²(2) = 88.458  ***  χ²(2) = 88.458  *** 
Hansen-Sargan  χ²(1) = 0.000    χ²(1) = 0.101   
Centered R²  0.3970    0.0693   
Note: the industry dummy coefficients are not shown here; the test on their joint significance is 
reported, though. The instruments used are AMT/PROJ_past5yrs and PROJ/EMP_past5yrs. The 
standard errors (between brackets) are heteroskedasticly consistent. Number of obs.: 441. 
6. Conclusion 
Government intervention in private R&D activity is common practice nowadays. 
However, its impact may not be unambiguously positive, as presupposed by many 
governments. In the first place, one could ask whether R&D grants actually stimulate private 
R&D investments: companies may simply replace private R&D budgets with the public 
money provided by the government. This is the main question to which researchers try to find 
an answer in additionality research. However, even if an increase in private R&D investment 
is confirmed (as concluded by many scholars), this may not automatically induce more R&D 
activity: the additional R&D budget may be crowded out by duplicate or more risky research,   33
or a mere increase in researcher wages without any impact on the R&D activity of a company 
and as a result render an R&D grant, although to the benefit of private R&D expenditure, 
ineffective.  
This paper provides insights into the impact of R&D grants, giving audience to the 
appeal of David and Hall (2000) to include labour market dynamics in the traditional 
application of treatment effects models in additionality research. I empirically analyze the 
effect of public R&D subsidies on private R&D investments, employment and wages in 
Flanders, employing parametric treatment effects models and IV regression methods. The 
main data source is the Flemish R&D Survey, supplemented with information from 
companies’ balance sheets (National Bank of Belgium), patenting activity (EPO) and subsidy 
history (IWT). 
Size, previous innovative activity, international competition, group membership, foreign 
ownership and industry affiliation may induce a considerable selection bias, rendering the 
receipt of a subsidy endogenous. Controlling for this bias with information on the company’s 
subsidy history, I conclude that R&D subsidies in Flanders bring about positive additionality 
effects, measured in R&D expenditure. Moreover, this public R&D funding is translated into 
more R&D activity: funded companies employ more R&D personnel, suggesting that the 
supply of R&D personnel in Flanders is not fully inelastic. Full crowding-out effects are 
rejected. However, partial crowding-out cannot be ruled out: funded companies do not add the 
whole subsidy amount to their private R&D budget. This analysis highlights the importance 
of evaluating the effectiveness of the R&D policy in terms of both the funding status and the 
grant size. The estimates indicate that, to some extent, the private R&D activity is reduced 
and replaced by the subsidy. The results for the impact on R&D expenditure and employment 
are very comparable; they change likewise.  
However, next to a significantly positive impact on R&D expenditure and R&D 
staffing, also an increase in R&D wages is found in firms receiving R&D subsidies. A 
mismatch between the demand and supply of R&D employees may enforce an increase in 
labour costs for the companies, which translates in increased R&D remuneration. In the 
European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) country reports, the drivers of innovative activity are 
assessed at the country level (PRO INNO EUROPE, 2007). Belgium is among the TOP10 in 
the EU27. Although it is clear that its performance lags behind in several indicators, and 
Belgium’s weak competence in capitalizing the full benefits of above average levels of R&D 
and innovation expenditure in terms of innovative output is exposed, the main strength of the   34
Belgian innovation system seems to lie in its strong relative performance on human resources 
in innovation. Despite a small shortage of skilled technical staff in specific industries, 
especially in the Walloon region, and a considerable outgoing brain drain, which are 
denounced in the EIS report, the analysis in this paper shows that the Flemish human 
resources in innovation seem to be sufficiently strong to withstand an increase in the demand 
for R&D employees and to provide a significantly large supply in response. Conversely, also 
an upskilling process could be an underlying explanation for an increase in R&D wages after 
the receipt of a subsidy. As the increase in R&D employment is significant and as mainly the 
number of researchers is increased after a subsidy receipt, I tend to believe that a change in 
the composition of the workforce towards more highly skilled employees is the main force 
driving inter-firm R&D wage dispersion between funded and non-funded firms.  
In these last paragraphs, I come to some final caveats which the reader should bear in 
mind and which give way to further research. First, the restriction to R&D active companies 
implies that the additionality effect can only be derived in terms of additional R&D spending. 
However, subsidies can be a trigger, pushing companies without any R&D activity to become 
R&D active. If these switchers would be taken into account as well, the treatment effects are 
very likely to be higher. Second, the literature review implies that the effect of an R&D 
subsidy may be very different in the long run. Here, short term effects were investigated. 
However, the increase in R&D activity on the short run may induce different effects on the 
long run. The impact on the R&D personnel demand may become even larger, when, as one 
could expect, the elasticity of labour supply is larger in the long run: more R&D personnel 
becomes available as idle R&D educated people switch to R&D jobs and new R&D educated 
people become available on the job market. Research on the long term effects would therefore 
add much value to the existing studies. Third, a profound analysis of the determinants of R&D 
wages is highly relevant. The composition of the workforce was revealed as a very important 
factor, while the union’s bargaining power does not seem to play. However, an extension of 
the current model, including other potential determinants, seems a promising research field. 
Fourth, the variables reflecting the wage structure do not capture other benefits to reward 
R&D personnel. Examples are stock options or other fringe benefits. Taking these rewards 
additionally into account could refine the analysis currently presented here. However, this 
information is very difficult to obtain and highly company-specific. Last, it would be highly 
interesting to evaluate the R&D output effects of the increase in R&D activity. Some work 
has been done in this respect, using patenting activity (Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006 as well as   35
Schneider, 2008) or the introduction of new products (Aerts, 2008; Hujer and Radić, 2005 as 
well as Bérubé and Mohnen, 2007), but the topic deserves further elaboration. Also, the 
relationship between researcher wages and innovative performance seems to be a valuable 
research domain. 
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